We present a device-independent randomness expansion protocol, involving only a constant number of non-signaling quantum devices, that achieves infinite expansion: starting with m bits of uniform private randomness, the protocol can produce an unbounded amount of certified randomness that is exp(−Ω(m 1/3 ))-close to uniform and secure against a quantum adversary. The only parameters which depend on the size of the input are the soundness of the protocol and the security of the output (both are inverse exponential in m). This settles a long-standing open problem in the area of randomness expansion and device-independence.
Introduction
Bell's Theorem states that the outcomes of local measurements on spatially separated systems cannot be predetermined, due to the phenomenon of quantum entanglement [Bel64] . This is one of the most important "no-go" results in physics because it rules out the possibility of a local hidden variable theory that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. However, Bell's Theorem has also found application in quantum information as a positive result, in that it gives a way to certify the generation of genuine randomness: if measurement outcomes of separated systems exhibit non-local correlations (e.g. correlations that violate so-called Bell Inequalities), then the outcomes cannot be deterministic. While Bell's Theorem does give a method to certify randomness, there is a caveat. The measurement settings used on the separated systems have to be chosen at random! Nevertheless, it is possible to choose the measurement settings in a randomness-efficient manner such that the measurement outcomes certifiably contain more randomness (as measured by, say, min-entropy) than the amount of randomness used as input. This is the idea behind randomness expansion protocols, in which a classical experimenter, starting with m-bits of uniform randomness, can interact with physically isolated devices to certifiably generate g(m) bits of (information theoretic) randomness (ideally with g(m) ≫ m). Furthermore, these protocols are device-independent: the only assumption made on the devices is that they cannot communicate, and obey the laws of quantum mechanics. In particular, there is no a priori assumption on the internal structure or dynamics of the devices. Indeed, the devices may even have been manufactured by an adversary! First proposed by Colbeck [Col09] in 2006, device-independent randomness expansion has flourished into an active area of research [CK11, PAM10, VV12a, FGS13, CVY13, AMP12, UZZ + 13, GL + 13, MS14] . Its study has synthesized a diverse array of concepts from quantum information theory, theoretical computer science, and quantum cryptography, including generalized Bell inequalities [PAM10, AMP12, PM13, FGS13] , the monogamy of entanglement [VV12a, RUV12] , randomness extractors [Ren08, KT08, DPVR12] , and quantum key distribution [BHK05, MPA11, VV12b, MS14] . Randomness expansion has even been experimentally realized by [PAM10] , who reported the generation of 42 bits of certified randomness (over the course of a month).
The fundamental problem in analyzing a randomness expansion protocol is in demonstrating a lower bound on the amount of certified randomness, usually measured by min-entropy. There have been a couple of different approaches. A line of works, starting with [PAM10] , gives bounds on the min-entropy by analytically relating the extent to which a Bell inequality is violated to the "guessing probability" of the protocol's output [PAM10, FGS13, AMP12, PM13] . Another approach, developed in [VV12a] , is to utilize the operational definition of min-entropy in a "guessing game", which establishes that a low min-entropy output implies that the non-signaling devices must have communicated during the protocol (a contradiction). This latter approach yields a protocol (which we will refer to as the Vazirani-Vidick protocol in this paper) that not only achieves the state-of-the-art expansion factor g(m) = exp(m 1/3 ), but is also quantum secure: that is, the output contains high min-entropy even from the perspective of a malicious eavesdropper that may be entangled with the protocol devices. Recently, a work by [MS14] not only achieves quantum security, but randomness expansion that tolerates a constant level of noise in the devices.
The original protocol of [Col09, CK11] obtained g(m) = Θ(m), or linear expansion. This was improved by Pironio et al. [PAM10] to achieve quadratic expansion g(m) = Θ(m 2 ). The protocols of [VV12a, FGS13, MS14] achieve exponential expansion. Perhaps the most tantalizing open question in randomness expansion is: how large an expansion factor g(m) can we achieve? For example, is there a protocol with expansion factor g(m) that is doubly-exponential in m? Is there any upper bound on randomness expansion in general?
The only known upper bounds on randomness expansion apply to non-adaptive protocols with two devices (i.e., where the referee's inputs to the devices do not depend on their previous outputs) [CVY13] . There the authors showed that noise robust, non-adaptive protocols must have a finite bound on their expansion factor 1 . With the exception of [FGS13] , randomness expansion protocols prior to our work were non-adaptive, and hence the results of [CVY13] suggest those protocols have a bounded expansion factor. Thus, going beyond the the finite expansion barrier appears to require adaptivity -but it could, a priori, be the case that even adaptive protocols are inherently limited to finite randomness expansion.
We present an adaptive protocol that achieves infinite certifiable randomness expansion, using a constant number of non-signaling quantum devices. The output length of our protocol depends only on the number of rounds performed in the protocol (which can be arbitrarily large), and not on the size of the initial random seed! This shows that there is no finite upper bound on the expansion factor of adaptive protocols. Our protocol involves a constant number -eight, specifically -of non-communicating black-box quantum devices, and guarantees that the output of the protocol is close to uniformly random, even from the point of view of a quantum eavesdropper (where the closeness to uniformity is determined by the initial seed length). Our protocol works even in the presence of arbitrary entanglement between the devices and an eavesdropper.
The key technical component of the analysis of the InfiniteExpansion protocol is to show that a subprotocol, which we call ClusterExpansion, is Input Secure: it generates uniform randomness secure against a quantum adversary, even if that adversary generated the seed randomness earlier in the protocol! Since the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol is Input Secure, composing ClusterExpansion with itself in sequence (i.e. using the outputs of one instance of the protocol as the inputs of another instance) yields another randomness expansion protocol, this time with much larger expansion factor. Our InfiniteExpansion protocol is the infinite composition of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol.
In Section 2.2, we discuss two relevant and enlightening results about randomness expansion [CSW14, MS14] , which were announced after the original posting of this work (though these results were discovered independently and, unbeknownst to the authors, developed in parallel with this work).
We note here that any exponential randomness expansion protocol with security against a quantum eavesdropper (such as the Vazirani-Vidick protocol, for example) readily yields a protocol using 2N devices, which has a randomness expansion given by an exponential tower function of N (i.e. 2 2 2 ... 2 N ): after running such a quantum-secure expansion protocol on one pair of devices, the devices are discarded, and their outputs are fed into a fresh pair of devices (that did not communicate with any previous devices used in the protocol). This "exponential tower" protocol terminates when all 2N devices have been used. This was first observed by [Yue13] , and in [MS14] it is noted that the robust exponential expansion protocol given therein can be used to obtain an analogous "tower" randomness expansion protocol, which is also robust.
For all practical intents and purposes, a "tower" expansion protocol can certify much, much (... ) more randomness than would ever be needed in practice, so one might consider it effectively an "infinite" randomness expansion protocol. However, such a protocol avoids the need to reuse devices, and hence sidesteps the need for Input Security -but secure device reuse is the key conceptual issue that we find interesting! Finally, the work [CSW14] serves as one very interesting example (discovered independently of this work) of how the concept of Input Security is relevant to problems other than infinite randomness expansion. We note that our result can be combined with a quantum-secure randomness amplification protocol (for example [CSW14] , or [BRG + 13] ) to produce an infinite randomness amplification protocol.
Barriers to infinite randomness expansion
Here we identify the inherent technical challenges in analyzing any adaptive randomness expansion protocol. In Section 2 we discuss how to overcome these challenges. Some of the technical issues discussed here have been identified in previous work (e.g., [FGS13] ) and in randomness expansion folklore.
The Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems
In any adaptive randomness expansion scheme there is a stage when intermediate outputs of the protocol are used to generate "derived" inputs for some devices in future stages of the protocol. This creates an inherent difficulty in analyzing adaptive protocols, because the devices involved in the protocol may adversarially take advantage of memory and shared entanglement to attempt to create harmful correlations between intermediate outputs and the the internal state of the devices that receive the "derived" inputs. To prove the correctness of an adaptive randomness expansion protocol, one must show that the devices receiving these "derived" inputs cannot distinguish them from inputs generated by a truly private random seed. Because of this fundamental challenge, there are very few analyses of adaptive randomness expansion protocols (or key distribution protocols for that matter) in the existing literature. Prior to our work, [FGS13] gave the only analysis of an adaptive randomness expansion protocol. However, their analysis requires the assumption that entanglement is only shared between certain pairs of devices, but otherwise that the devices are unentangled.
In the general case where devices can share arbitrary entanglement and may be entangled with an eavesdropper, we face the issue of the quantum security of the intermediate outputs against devices that will receive the derived inputs 2 . This issue manifests itself in two different forms: the Input Security Problem and the Extractor Seed Problem.
Generally, a randomness expansion protocol is comprised of two components: an expansion component and an extractor component. The expansion component will generate an output string that, while not necessarily close to uniformly random, will be guaranteed to have high minentropy. The extractor component will then take this high min-entropy source, as well as a small polylogarithmic-sized uniformly random seed (taken, for example, from the initial seed of the randomness expansion protocol), and convert the high min-entropy source into a string that is close to uniform.
The Input Security Problem. In an adaptive protocol, we require that the output of the expansion component contains high min-entropy relative to a quantum eavesdropper (i.e. high conditional minentropy) -where we treat the other devices in the protocol, collectively, as the eavesdropper. However, the Vazirani-Vidick protocol -an quantum-secure exponential randomness expansion protocol that produces an output with high conditional min-entropy 3 -uses, in its analysis, an assumption that the initial seed to the protocol is secure against the eavesdropper [VV12a] . This is a condition that cannot be satisfied in an adaptive protocol. Suppose in an adaptive protocol some device D produced an intermediate output X, which we use as the derived input to some other device D ′ as input randomness. Note that X is not secure against D. Hence, we cannot use the analysis of [VV12a] as is and treat D as an eavesdropper, and argue that D ′ produces an output Y that is secure against D. We refer to this issue as the Input Security Problem.
The Extractor Seed Problem. Even supposing that we had an expansion component that was immune to the Input Security Problem (i.e. produces output that contains high conditional minentropy despite the input being known to the eavesdropper), we would still suffer from a similar problem with the extractor component. Here, we need to use a small polylogarithmic-sized uniform extractor seed to convert a source of high conditional min-entropy into a string that is nearly uniform, relative to a quantum adversary.
First, note that we cannot always take the extractor seed from the original random seed to the protocol, because this would limit us to exponential randomness expansion. Thus to achieve super-exponential expansion, the extractor seed must eventually be generated by intermediate outputs of the protocol.
Secondly, the existing quantum-secure extractors in the literature (e.g., see [DPVR12, KT08, Ren08] ) require that the extractor seed be secure against the quantum eavesdropper. As pointed out by [FGS13] , provably satisfying this requirement in an adaptive randomness expansion protocol involves overcoming a technical difficulty similar to that of the Input Security Problem. We refer to this technical barrier as the Extractor Seed Problem.
To summarize, in order to obtain quantum security of the output against an eavesdropper E, current quantum-secure expansion protocols and extraction procedures require the strong assumption that the joint state of the seed, the devices, and the eavesdropper ρ SDE is such that ρ SDE ≈ U |S| ⊗ ρ DE , where U |S| denotes the uniform distribution on |S| bits, and ρ DE denotes the internal state of the devices and adversary. In order to solve the Input Security and Extractor Seed Problems, we require randomness expansion protocols and extraction schemes that work with the weaker assumption that ρ SD ≈ U |S| ⊗ ρ D -with no mention of the eavesdropper! -while still obtaining the same quantum-security guarantees. We call this property Input Security, and say that protocols with this property are Input Secure.
It is interesting to note that extractors, by themselves, cannot satisfy a property like Input Security (i.e. we cannot guarantee that an extractor will produce private randomness when the seed is prepared by the adversary) 4 .
The primary conceptual contribution of our paper is the design and analysis of the first randomness expansion protocols and extraction schemes that are (provably) Input Secure.
The Conditioning Security Problem
The output guarantees of a randomness expansion protocol only hold conditioned on the protocol succeeding (i.e. conditioned on the event that the referee does not abort). Thus, the analysis of the security properties of the output of a protocol must take into account the fact that conditioning can skew the distribution of the output. Adversarially designed devices may, for example, coordinate to pass the protocol only when the first bit of the output is "1". This alone does not harm the min-entropy of the output by much, but suggests that there could be other strategies employed by adversarial devices to significantly weaken the security of the output. In [VV12a] , they show that such a collusion strategy would imply that the eavesdropper and the devices could communicate with each other, a contradiction. However, this analysis again relies on the assumption that the initial seed is secure against the eavesdropper. When analyzing an Input Secure protocol, we cannot use this assumption, so resolving this Conditioning Security Problem requires different techniques.
The Compounding Error Problem
Another technical concern is the problem of error accumulation in an adaptive protocol. When using intermediate outputs to generate derived inputs for later stages in the protocol, we can only assume, at best, that the derived inputs are approximately secure and uniform. Furthermore, these errors will accumulate over the course of the protocol, and in an infinite expansion protocol, this accumulation could grow so large that the protocol will fail to work at some point. Depending on how one measures the security of a string against an quantum eavesdropper, errors may not accumulate in a linear fashion -as pointed out by [KRBM07] , even if the accessible information of a string relative to an eavesdropper (which has been used as a standard security measure in quantum key distribution) is small, a tiny piece of classical side information could completely break the security of the string. Such an ill-behaved measure of quantum security would severely complicate the analysis of an adaptive randomness protocol.
Results
We present a protocol that attains infinite randomness expansion. Our protocol, which we denote the InfiniteExpansion protocol, involves a constant number of non-signaling devices (eight, specifically) that, with m bits of seed randomness, can produce an arbitrarily large amount of certified randomness. In particular, starting with m bits of random seed, if InfiniteExpansion is run for k iterations, the output of the k iterations is a random string that is exp(−Ω(m 1/3 ))-close to uniform, and has length
i.e., a k-height tower of exponentials in m. The initial seed length m controls soundness parameters of the protocol, but has no bearing on the amount of certified output randomness! Our protocol uses as subroutines the exponential expansion protocol of [VV12a] (which we denote VV) 5 , and the sequential CHSH game protocol of Reichardt, et al. [RUV12] (which we denote RUV). See Section 4 for more detail on these sub-protocols. We describe the protocol below, both algorithmically and schematically (see Figure 1) . The algorithmic specification of the InfiniteExpansion protocol. VV(A, B, X) (resp. RUV(A, B, X)) denotes executing the VV (resp. RUV) sub-protocol with devices A and B using seed randomness X (for more details about these sub-protocols see Section 4). 
For
Furthermore, there exists a quantum strategy for the devices such that, with high probability, they do not abort the protocol at any round.
The analysis of the InfiniteExpansion protocol overcomes the challenges described in the previous section. We now give an overview of how we solve them.
Our proof strategy
Solving the Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems. The key technique for solving both the Extractor Seed and Input Security Problems is a powerful result of Reichardt, Unger, and Vazirani [RUV12] , which is based on the phenomenon of CHSH game rigidity. The CHSH game is a two-player game in which a classical referee chooses two input bits x and y uniformly at random, and gives them to non-communicating players Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob produce binary outputs a and b, and they win the game if a ⊕ b = x ∧ y. If Alice and Bob employ classical strategies, they cannot win the CHSH game with probability exceeding 75%, but using shared quantum entanglement, there is a quantum strategy that allows them to win the game with probability cos 2 (π/8) ≈ 85%. The CHSH game is frequently used in the study of quantum entanglement and non-locality. More relevantly, it also serves as the basis for many randomness expansion protocols in the literature: protocols will often test for Bell inequality violations by measuring how often devices win the CHSH game.
The famous Tsirelson's Theorem states that cos 2 (π/8) is the optimal winning probability using quantum strategies. Even more remarkable is that the CHSH game is rigid: there is essentially a unique quantum strategy that achieves this optimum. That is, any quantum strategy that achieves cos 2 (π/8) winning probability must be, in a specific sense, isomorphic to the "canonical" CHSH strategy which involves Alice and Bob making specific measurements on separate halves of an EPR pair 6 (which we will call the ideal CHSH strategy). Furthermore, CHSH game rigidity is robust: any strategy that achieves cos 2 (π/8) − ε winning probability must be isomorphic to a strategy that is O( Sequential CHSH game rigidity is a powerful tool that allows one to characterize the behavior of separated quantum devices, simply from observing the correlations between their (classical) inputs and outputs. Reichardt et al. use sequential CHSH games as a primitive in a more general protocol that allows a classical computer to command non-signaling quantum devices to perform arbitrary quantum computation -and verify that this computation has been performed correctly! Here, in contrast, our goal is much more modest: we simply want to command non-signaling quantum devices to generate uniformly random bits.
The CHSH ⊗N game already yields a protocol that produces certified randomness. In particular,
we have two non-signaling devices play N games of CHSH. The referee will check whether the devices won approximately cos 2 (π/8)N games. If so, the referee will select a block of t games at random, and use the output of one of the devices in that block of t games be the protocol's output -call this the RUV protocol.
We know from Theorem 2.2 that, with high probability, the outputs of the RUV protocol were generated by a strategy approximating the ideal sequential strategy. The ideal sequential strategy is the ideal CHSH measurement repeatedly applied to a tensor product of EPR pairs, so the measurement outcomes are necessarily in tensor product with an eavesdropper. Thus the outputs of RUV are approximately secure against a quantum adversary. The problem, of course, is that the amount of randomness needed by the referee to run this RUV protocol is much greater than the amount of certified randomness in the output (Θ(N) versus N 1/α ). So we can't use RUV by itself as a randomness expansion scheme.
However, sequential CHSH game rigidity offers more than just the guarantee of secure uniform randomness; observe that it does not need to assume that the inputs to the N CHSH games were secure against an eavesdropper -only that it was secure against the devices playing the CHSH games! This is precisely the Input Security property.
Thus, we can use the RUV protocol as a "scrambling" procedure that transforms an input that may not be secure against an eavesdropper into a shorter string that is secure against an eavesdropper.
Recall that, because of the Input Security and Extractor Seed Problems, the output of the VV subprotocol in the InfiniteExpansion protocol may not be secure against other devices (namely, the devices that produced the input to the VV sub-protocol). However, if we invoke the RUV protocol on the outputs of VV, we obtain secure outputs that can be used as input randomness for another VV instance.
Furthermore, observe that we still have achieved randomness expansion: the VV protocol attains exponential expansion, and the RUV protocol will only shrink that by a polynomial amount.
Solving the Conditioning Security Problem. The main technical contribution of our paper is solving the Conditioning Security Problem. While combining the VV and RUV protocols conceptually yields an Input Secure randomness expansion protocol, there still is the technical issue of whether this protocol is Input Secure when we condition on the RUV protocol succeeding. There are simple examples that show that adversarial devices can, via conditioning, skew the distribution of their outputs, and even introduce entanglement between some bits of their outputs and an eavesdropper, despite most outputs having been produced by an ideal strategy. The Sequential CHSH Game Rigidity Theorem of [RUV12] does not take conditioning into account, because it is assumed that the devices pass the RUV protocol with probability extremely close to 1.
Here, we assume the RUV protocol passes with some small probability that is inverse polynomial in the number of games played, and show that the RUV protocol manages to obtain an approximately secure output conditioned on the protocol succeeding. We prove this in Lemma 5.5, and our proof employs tools from quantum information theory. Our approach is reminiscent of that used in the proofs of the classical Parallel Repetition Theorem (see, e.g., [Hol07] ).
Solving the compounding error problem. We use the strongest definition of the quantum security of a string against an eavesdropper: namely, a string X is (approximately) secure against an eavesdropper E iff the trace distance between the joint state ρ XE and the ideal state U |X| ⊗ ρ E is small, where where U |X| denotes the uniform distribution on |X| bits. To solve the compounding error problem, we first show that the errors incurred at each iteration of the InfiniteExpansion protocol accumulate linearly -this is because the trace distance satisfies the triangle inequality. Then, we show that the error added at iteration k is exponentially smaller than the error of iteration k − 1. Thus, the infinite sum of errors converges to a constant multiple of the error incurred by the first iteration, which is exponentially small in the seed length m. Hence we avoid the potential problems raised by [KRBM07] .
Related work
Here we discuss some relevant recent developments in the area of randomness expansion and amplification, which were announced after the original posting of this work. We note, however, that the results in the following works were discovered independently of the results in this work, and their relationship to each other was only realized after both works were essentially complete. In the following description we will occasionally use the terminology of this paper to restate results of these other works, though those papers used different terminology in the original statements.
In independent work by Chung, Shi, and Wu [CSW14] , the problem of Input Security was also studied, and played a key role in their construction of a device-independent protocol to amplify randomness, starting with any min-entropy source. The authors require an Input Secure randomness expansion protocol to use as a building block for their amplification protocol. They prove an elegant result called the Equivalence Lemma, which may be informally summarized as follows (see [CSW14] for a formal statement):
Consider a device-independent randomness expansion protocol P, that starts with a seed S, uniform and in tensor product with the devices D involved in the protocol, as well as a quantum adversary E, and produces an output string X that is certifiably close to uniform and in tensor product with E and S. The Equivalence Lemma states that any such protocol P also certifies output randomness X with the same security guarantees, without requiring that S is in tensor product with E -in other words, any such protocol P is also Input Secure. In particular, this proves that the Vazirani-Vidick protocol (when implemented in composition with a strong quantum extractor) is, in fact, Input Secure, and can be composed with itself to perform unbounded randomness expansion in the same manner as we do here, without requiring the use of the RUV protocol.
Secondly, another independent work of Miller and Shi [MS14] gives the first provably robust protocol for randomness expansion (and, in fact, gives robust exponential expansion). Combining the main result of [MS14] with Equivalence Lemma of [CSW14] , allows one to obtain a provably robust infinite expansion protocol requiring only four non-communicating devices.
It is interesting to note that extractors (which have a similar input-output structure to randomness expansion protocols) cannot possess an analogous Input Security. Thus, there is no natural analogue of the Equivalence Lemma which will work for extractors. In this sense, the Equivalence Lemma represents an interesting phenomenon or property which is possessed by device independent (quantum) protocols, but not by (classical) protocols such as extractors.
Preliminaries

Notation
We 
Quantum information theory
For completeness we present a few key definitions and facts of quantum information theory that will be useful for us later. For a more comprehensive reference we refer the reader to, e.g., [NC10, Wil13] .
For a density matrix ρ, its von Neumann entropy is defined as H(ρ) := −tr(ρ log ρ). 
(Conditioning reduces entropy) Let
Finally, we define quantum min-entropy. Let ρ AB be a bipartite density matrix. The min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Let ε > 0. Then ε-smoothed min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
where B(ρ AB , ε) is the set of sub-normalized density matrices within trace distance ε of ρ AB . For a detailed reference on quantum min-entropy, we refer the reader to [Ren08] .
Modelling protocols and input robustness
In this paper, we will consider several different randomness expansion procedures (e.g., the VaziraniVidick protocol, or the RUV protocol); a crucial element of our analysis is that these protocols are all input robust in the sense that slight deviations from uniformity in their input seed only mildly affect the expansion guarantees that we get when assuming the seed is perfectly uniform. To make this input robustness property formal, we introduce the quantum operation description of randomness expansion protocols.
In general, a randomness expansion protocol is an interaction between a classical referee R and a quantum device D, that is entirely unconstrained, except that D consists of two or more isolated, non-signaling sub-devices (but the sub-devices may be entangled).
The important Hilbert spaces we will consider are: More precisely, let P be a randomness expansion protocol. We will model P as a quantum operation E acting on an initial state ρ i FSXD in the space H F ⊗ H S ⊗ H X ⊗ H D , where ρ i D is the internal state of D before the protocol starts, and ρ i FSX is prepared by the referee. E will be some unitary map V P applied to the joint state ρ i FSXD . Now, define the quantum operation F that takes a state ρ FSXD , and produces the post-measurement state of ρ FSXD conditioned on measuring |1 in the F register, and then traces out the F and S registers, leaving ρ XD|F=1 . We define F E to be the composition of the two quantum operations E, followed by F . Throughout this paper, we will decorate density matrices by superscripts i and f to denote the states before and after the protocol, respectively. For example, we will often let ρ f FSXD denote the state of the FSXD system after the execution of the protocol, conditioned on the protocol succeeding (i.e. F = 1).
The completeness and soundness of protocol P are statements about the post-measurement state 
. In other words, the initial seed is assumed to be perfectly uniform and unentangled with the device D. However, we also have a form of input robustness: if the initial state were instead δ-close in trace distance to the ideal initial state defined above, then we would obtain the same output parameters as P, up to an δ/λ additive factor in trace distance, where λ is the probability that |1 is measured in the F register. We prove this formally in Lemma 3.3 below. 
The proof of Lemma 3.3 is deferred to Appendix A. Another important primitive we will use is a quantum-secure extractor.
The Vazirani-Vidick protocol and quantum-secure extractors
Definition 3.5 (Quantum-secure extractor). A function
Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} r
is a (h, ε)-quantum-secure extractor iff for all cq-states ρ XE classical on n-bit strings X with H ∞ (X|E) ρ ≥ h, and for uniform seed S secure against X and E (that is, the joint state ρ XES is such that ρ XES
where ρ Ext(X,S)ES denotes the joint cqc-state on the extractor output, quantum side information E, and the seed S.
Theorem 3.6 ([DPVR12]). For all positive integers n, r, there exists a function
QExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} r that is a (r + O(log r) + O(log 1/ε), ε)-quantum-secure extractor where d = O(log 2 (n/ε) log r).
Sequential CHSH game rigidity
We can view a sequence of N CHSH games, played by non-signaling quantum devices D 1 , D 2 , as a protocol CHSH ⊗N , where the referee uses a private random seed S to generate inputs A i , B i ∈ {0, 1} to the devices D 1 and D 2 , and obtains their respective outputs X i , Y i ∈ {0, 1} for each round i ∈ [N]. The protocol succeeds if W, the number of rounds i such that
Divide the N rounds of the CHSH ⊗N protocol into blocks of t consecutive games each, where t = ⌊N 1/α ⌋ for some fixed constant α. Let X be the output register of device D 1 . Let X i denote the t-qubit register of the ith block of X.
We paraphrase the sequential CHSH game rigidity theorem of [RUV12] here. In the theorem, we imagine that for each block of games, the devices D 1 , D 2 apply some local quantum operation on their respective systems to produce outputs for the block. We call the quantum operation applied in each block i their block strategy for i. We say that a block strategy is ζ-ideal if there is a local isometry I under which their quantum operation E and the state acted upon by E are together ζ-close to the ideal CHSH strategy (for a precise definition of ζ-ideal strategies, see [RUV12] 
where ν = (12/ √ 2) log Nt/N 1/4 , and t > 85.
Proof. This is Theorem 5.38 of [RUV12] , instantiated with the parameter settings used in Theorem 5.39.
The Protocol
In this section we formally define the protocol for infinite certifiable randomness expansion, which we call the InfiniteExpansion protocol. The protocol uses eight non-signaling devices, which may all share entanglement, but cannot communicate with each other. The devices are partitioned into two Expansion Clusters C 0 and C 1 with four devices each. In each iteration, the InfiniteExpansion protocol alternates between clusters C 0 and C 1 , performing a sub-protocol called ClusterExpansion. The output of one cluster is used as seed randomness for the next invocation of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol with the other cluster. Only the first iteration requires some seed randomness, to "jumpstart" the randomness expansion process.
InfiniteExpansion Protocol
Non-signaling Clusters: C 0 , C 1 . Initial seed randomness: S ∼ U m .
1. Let X 1 ← S.
2. For i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
(b) If ClusterExpansion aborts, then abort the entire protocol, otherwise continue. The InfiniteExpansion protocol. The classical registers X i are maintained by the referee, and C i denotes cluster C i mod 2 . X i+1 ← ClusterExpansion(C i , X i ) denotes executing the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol with the devices in cluster C i , using X i as the seed randomness, and storing the sub-protocol output in register X i+1 .
We now specify the sub-protocol ClusterExpansion(C, S) for a 4-device cluster C and seed randomness S. As discussed earlier, two devices of a cluster C will be used to perform the Vazirani-Vidick near-exponential randomness expansion protocol, and the other two will be used to perform a variant of the CHSH ⊗N protocol, which we call the RUV protocol.
ClusterExpansion(C, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices:
3. If either of the above instances of VV or RUV aborts, then abort ClusterExpansion. Otherwise continue.
Output Z.
It is important that no subset of these devices can communicate with (signal to) any other subset of the devices throughout the course of the subroutine. We now give precise definitions of the VV and RUV sub-protocols.
The VV sub-protocol
The VV sub-protocol consists of performing Protocol B from [VV12a] , and then applying a randomness extractor to the output of Protocol B. For any s, Protocol B takes in a uniformly random s-bit seed, and conditioned on the protocol succeeding, produces a string of length n(s) = exp(Ω(s 1/3 )) with h(s) = exp(Ω(s 1/3 )) bits of (smoothed) min-entropy (see Theorem 3.4). We give a detailed account of the particular parameter settings we use for Protocol B in Appendix C.
We use the QExt randomness extractor given by Theorem 3.6. More formally, by QExt n,r,ε we denote the (r + O(log r)
For all s, the VV sub-protocol takes in a s-bit seed S, and outputs v(s) bits, where v(s) := exp(Ω(s 1/3 )) (for more detail, see Appendix C).
VV(A, B, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices: A, B Input Seed : S 1. Let S 1 be the first ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, and S 2 be the last ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, where s := |S|. 
The RUV sub-protocol
The RUV sub-protocol, using a random seed S, has two devices (call them A and B) play a number N of sequential CHSH games, where N is a function of |S|, and the inputs to the devices in each of the CHSH games are determined by half of S. The RUV sub-protocol aborts if they do not win nearly ≈ cos 2 (π/8) fraction of games. Then, the other half of S is used to select a random sub-block of A's outputs in the N CHSH games, and the sub-block is produced as the output of RUV.
More precisely, let X ∈ {0, 1} N denote A's outputs. Divide X into blocks of t consecutive bits, and further subdivide each block into √ t sub-blocks of √ t bits each. We set t = ⌊N 1/α ⌋, where α := ⌈16κ 2 * ⌉ and κ * is the constant from [RUV12, Theorem 5.7]. For all s, the RUV sub-protocol takes in a s-bit seed S, and outputs r(s) bits, where r(s) := ⌊(s/4) 1/(2α) ⌋.
RUV(A, B, S) Sub-Protocol
Input Non-signaling Devices: A, B Input Seed : S 1. Let S 1 be the first ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, and S 2 be the last ⌊s/2⌋ bits of S, where s := |S|. 4. Let W be the number of indices i such that
then abort RUV. Otherwise, continue.
5. Output Z, the √ t-bit string that is the jth sub-block of the ith block of X, where X is the register that holds the outputs (x i ), and i and j are selected uniformly from
, respectively, using the seed S 2 . 
Analysis of the InfiniteExpansion Protocol
We now analyze the InfiniteExpansion protocol. As discussed in the Preliminaries (Section 3), we will use the notation ρ i and ρ f (or some variant thereof) to denote the state of the registers, devices, eavesdroppers, etc., before and after the execution of a protocol, respectively. We will use the following functions throughout this section: v(s) and r(s) to denote the output lengths of the VV and RUV sub-protocols on inputs of length s, respectively (defined in Section 4). The output length of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol on an s-bit seed is g(s) := r (v(s) ). We will use g (k) (s) to denote the k-fold composition of g(s) (i.e. g (1) (s) = g(s), g (2) (s) = g (g(s) ), etc.).
Theorem 5.1 establishes that there exists a quantum strategy by which the devices, with high probability, do not abort the InfiniteExpansion protocol. Theorem 5.2 establishes the soundness of the InfiniteExpansion protocol. 
where
• C ′′ is the universal constant from Theorem 5.3, and
• ρ k X k E denotes the joint state of the referee's X k register and E after k rounds of the InfiniteExpansion(C 0 , C 1 ) Protocol, conditioned on the event WIN ≤k .
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 5.2, we wish to direct the reader's attention to the Input Security of the InfiniteExpansion protocol: the assumption on the initial seed is that it is in tensor product with the cluster devices only, and not the eavesdropper E -however, the output at each iteration is close to being in tensor product with the eavesdropper E.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 assumes the correctness of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol (Theorem 5.3), and shows that the InfiniteExpansion protocol maintains the property that at each iteration i, the output of X of cluster C i (where C i denotes Expansion Cluster C i mod 2 ) is approximately secure against the other cluster C i+1 . Thus, the the execution of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol with C i+1 , conditioned on not aborting, will continue to produce a nearly uniform output. Furthermore, the errors accumulate linearly with each iteration.
Proof. Define C j := C j mod 2 . Divide the overall probability of success, Pr(WIN ≤k ), into conditional probabilities: let p = Pr(WIN ≤k ) and let p i = Pr (WIN i |WIN ≤i−1 ) . Observe that we have p = ∏ p i ≥ λ. We prove the claim by induction.
The inductive hypothesis: Recursively define δ(i)
where ρ i X i C i C i+1 E is the joint state of the X i register, both clusters C i and C i+1 , and E after the ith round, conditioned on WIN ≤i .
Let k = 1. Then, by invoking Theorem 5.3 with C = C 1 , and treating the quantum eavesdropper as C 2 and E together, we obtain that there exists a state µ 1
. This establishes the base case. Now, suppose that we have run k − 1 rounds of the InfiniteExpansion protocol for some k > 1. Using our inductive assumption for i = k − 1, we invoke Theorem 5.3 along with Lemma 3.3 to conclude that there exists a state µ k
This completes the induction argument. We now bound δ(k):
where we write ε i := ε EC (g (i) (m), p i ), and use the facts that ∏ p i ≥ λ and each ε i is exponentially smaller than ε i−1 .
Finally, for every k, we have that
Next, we argue that the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol is an Input Secure randomness expansion scheme. The correctness of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol assumes the correctness of VV and RUV protocols (Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5, respectively). Proof. Let λ 1 denote the probability that Step 1 of ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeds, and let λ 2 denote the probability that Step 2 of ClusterExpansion(C, S) succeeds, conditioned on Step 1 succeeding, so that λ 1 λ 2 ≥ λ. Let C consist of devices D = {D 1 , D 2 } and G = {G 1 , G 2 }, where the D i 's are used for execution of the VV protocol, and the G j 's are used for the execution of the RUV protocol. Let Y be the output of VV(D 1 , D 2 , S) (which is Step 1 of ClusterExpansion(C, S)). By definition of the VV protocol, |Y| = v(m). By Lemma 5.4 and our assumption on S (in particular, that
where ρ v denotes the state of the system after running the VV protocol (and conditioned on it succeeding) but before executing the RUV protocol, and ε VV (·) is the error bound given by Lemma 5.4. Let X be the output of
Imagine that we executed the RUV protocol on the "ideal" input τ v YDGE . By Lemma 5.5, we would get that there existed a state τ
where ε RUV (·, ·) is the error bound given by Lemma 5.5. However, we only have the approximate guarantee on Y given by (1). So, by Lemma 3.3, we instead get that there exists a state τ
Plugging in the expressions for ε RUV and ε VV , we get that this is at most
for some universal constant C ′′ .
Analysis of the VV protocol
In the next two sections, we analyze that the VV and the RUV components of the ClusterExpansion sub-protocol. As discussed in the introduction, the VV protocol in a cluster C will provide nearexponential randomness expansion, although the analysis of [VV12a] does not allow us to conclude that the output is secure against the other cluster C ′ (i.e. the Input Security Problem) 8 . The RUV protocol in C will be used to transform the output of VV to be secure against C ′ . Observe that, qualitatively, the RUV protocol solves the Input Security Problem because in Lemma 5.5, the random seed is not required to be secure against an eavesdropper, yet the output is guaranteed to be! On the other hand, Lemma 5.4 below requires the assumption that the seed to the VV protocol is secure against the protocol's devices and the eavesdropper simultaneously. Proof. The VV protocol consists of two parts, executing Protocol B of [VV12a] using half of the seed S (which we denote by S 1 ) to produce an output Y of length exp(Ω(m 1/3 )) which contains high min-entropy (conditioned on Protocol B not aborting), and then applying a randomness extractor using Y as the source, and the other half of S (which we denote by S 2 ) as the extractor seed, to produce an output X that is close to uniform.
Let ρ v YE denote the joint state of the output of Protocol B (
Step 2 of the VV protocol) and the eavesdropper E, conditioned on Protocol B not aborting. Then, by our assumption on S and by Theorem 3.4, we get that
The VV protocol then applies a quantum-secure randomness extractor to the source Y, with seed S 2 . The protocol uses the QExt : {0, . Then, by the triangle inequality, we have
Since E is trace-preserving, we can bound the first term by ε. The second term is bounded by ε via equation (2). The third term is bounded by ε because the trace distance is non-increasing with respect to the partial trace. Thus,
We then apply Lemma B.2 to obtain that there exists a state τ XDE such that
which proves the claim.
Analysis of the RUV protocol
In this section, we analyze the RUV protocol. Before stating Lemma 5.5, it will be necessary to give formal and precise definitions of several (classical) random variables, and how they interact with the relevant quantum states.
Let S be an m-bit seed used in the RUV protocol, performed with non-signaling devices D 1 and D 2 . Half of S, call it S 1 , is used for N CHSH games, where N = m/4. Recall that we divide the N CHSH games into blocks of t = N 1/α consecutive games. Define the following random variables:
1. Let F denote the indicator variable that is 1 iff the RUV protocol doesn't abort in Step 4 (i.e. the devices win ≈ cos 2 (π/8)N CHSH games). Note that F is a deterministic function of the devices' outputs and S 1 . 
Thus, we can meaningfully condition the state ρ FI i XDE on various values of F and I i . For example, when we refer to the state ρ XE|F=1 , we mean the state that is, up to a normalization factor,
In particular, we will make use of the fact that ρ XE|F=1 = Pr( Proof. Let ρ i XDFE be the joint state of the X, D, F, and E registers before the N CHSH games are played (so X and F are initialized to the all 0 state). For this proof, we will assume that E is such that ρ i XDFE is a pure state. This is without loss of generality, because we can take a non-pure state ρ i XDFE and augment it with some extension E ′ ⊃ E such that ρ i XDFE ′ is pure (e.g. via a purification of the state ρ i XDFE ). Observe that ρ
tr ≤ ε, because the trace distance is non-increasing under discarding the augmented system E ′ \E.
For notational clarity, we shall omit the superscripts i and f , because we focus on the state ρ FSXDE of the system after the N CHSH games (i.e. the X register holds the output of device D 1 ), but before conditioning on F = 1 and before using the seed S 2 to select a sub-block. The i th block of X will be denoted X i , and the j th sub-block of the i th block will be denoted X ij .
There are two main components to this proof.
1. We argue that, for the state ρ XE|F=1 , there is a 1 − δ fraction of sub-blocks X ij such that
where we set η and δ later in the proof. We say that such sub-blocks are η-good with respect to E.
2. We argue that the string S 2 (substring of the seed S used to select the sub-block that RUV(D 1 , D 2 , S) will output) is in tensor product with a string describing the locations of the η-good subblocks of the state ρ XE|F=1 .
In particular, let Z := X S 2 denote the sub-block selected by string S 2 . From the above two components, it follows that, for the state ρ XE|F=1 , the the random variable Z is (η + δ)-good with respect to E, i.e.,
We then invoke Lemma B.2 to argue that there exists a state τ ZDE such that
and we are done. We now proceed to proving the first two components.
There are many good sub-blocks. By the definition of I i and Lemma 3.7,
It follows by Proposition 5.6 that, for at least a 1 − t −1/4 fraction of sub-blocks j of block i we have that
If we then condition on the event F = 1 it follows that
We wish to establish the above statement for the state ρ X ij E|F=1 rather than the state ρ X ij E|I i =1,F=1 . The key to making this transition is to establish that, for many values of i, the event F = 1 is approximately a sub-event of the event I i = 1. To do so, it is helpful to consider the event H = 1. 
Consider such a block i. Note that by Theorem 3.8, Pr(H = 0, F = 1) ≤ t −2 . Thus
where X i,<j denotes all the X ik such that k < j. We will omit the subscript σ because the underlying state is clear from context. We upper-bound the quantity I(X i : FE) via the following calculation:
Equation (7) is the definition of mutual information. Equations (8), (9), and (10) follow from the definition of conditional mutual entropy. Equation (11) follows from our assumption that σ X i E = σ X i ⊗ σ E . Equation (13) follows from the fact that conditioning can only reduce entropy, and that
−H(F|X i E) ≤ H(F).
We now lower bound the individual terms of the expectation I(X ij : FE|X i,<j ).
Equation (15) is the definition of conditional mutual information. Equation (16) follows because σ X i = U t (hence σ X ij is in tensor product with σ X i,<j ), and conditioning can only reduce entropy. Finally, equation (17) is again the definition of mutual information.
Thus,
and by Markov's inequality, we get that 1 − µ fraction of j's are such that I(X ij : FE) ≤ 2 µR . Setting µ = t −1/4 completes the proof.
Conclusion
We have presented a randomness expansion protocol that achieves infinite expansion: starting with m bits of uniform seed, the protocol produces an arbitrarily long output string that is exp(−Ω(m
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Define µ XDE to be the state τ XDE as given by the assumption in the lemma on input σ FSXDE where σ FSXD = σ FSX ⊗ σ D . By the triangle inequality, we have:
We bound the first term on the right hand side:
Let λ ′ denote the probability that the F register of the state E ⊗ 1 E (σ FSXDE ), when measured, has outcome |1 . Note that max{λ, λ ′ } ≥ λ, so the first inequality follows from Lemma B.1. The second inequality follows because trace-preserving quantum operations are contractive with respect to the trace distance. The final inequality comes from our assumption on ρ i FSXDE . The second term on the right hand side of (18) is bounded by ε from our assumption on the quantum operation F E . Proof. We use the operational interpretation of the trace norm of two quantum states, namely, that ρ − σ tr = max A Pr(A(ρ) = 1) − Pr(A(σ) = 1), where ρ and σ are arbitrary density matrices, and the maximization is over all possible 0/1-valued POVMs A.
B Useful lemmata
Let λ ρ and λ σ denote Pr ρ (E) and Pr σ (E) respectively. We consider two cases: λ ρ ≥ λ σ and λ ρ < λ σ . Take the first case. A 1 A 2 B ) . Because trace-preserving quantum maps are contractive under the trace norm, we obtain ρ A 1 A 2 B − τ A 1 A 2 B tr ≤ √ ε, and we are done.
C Parameter settings for the VV sub-protocol
For the sake of concreteness, we specify the settings of parameters to be used in the instantiation of Protocol B of [VV12a] in our VV sub-protocol (see Section 4). We choose constants α, γ > 0 such that γ ≤ 1/(10 + 8α). These constants are part of the definition of VV and will remain unchanged for every instance of VV throughout the InfiniteExpansion protocol.
In [VV12a, Theorem 2], the parameter h specifies the min-entropy lower bound of Protocol B, which in turn governs the length of the seed to Protocol B and length of the output. By definition Protocol B implemented with parameter h requires at most K 1 γ −3 log 3 (h) bits of seed for some fixed constant K 1 (this constant may depend on α, but since α is a global constant here, we ignore this). When Protocol B is invoked by VV(A, B, S), we will set h = 2 γ ⌊s/2⌋
, where s := |S|, and it follows that Protocol B, with these parameters, will require no more than ⌊s/2⌋ bits of seed.
We will now discuss parameters relevant to the quantum extractor which will be used in VV.
Let us now define t := h Thus, in specifying the VV sub-protocol and throughout the paper, we will set the following functions, where s is the length of input to the VV sub-protocol:
• Min-entropy lower bound of Protocol B:
h(s) := 2 γ ⌊s/2⌋
• Output length of Protocol B:
n(s) := 10C s 2K 1 4/3 2 (s/(2K 1 )) 1/3 .
• Seed length of the extractor:
• Output length of the extractor/VV sub-protocol:
v(s) := ⌊h(s)/2⌋.
